A solution to the problem of detecting and identifying control system component failures in linear time-invariant systems is given using the geometric concept of an unobservability subspace. Conditions are developed under which it is possible to design a causal linear processor that can be used to detect and uniquely identify a component failure in a linear time-invariant system, assuming either i) the components can fail simultaneously, or ii) the components can fail only one at a time. Explicit design algorithms are provided when those conditions are satisfied. In addition to the time domain solvability conditions, the frequency domain interpretation of the results are given, and connection is drawn with the results already available in the literature.
i 
Introduction
In many applications high reliability control systems are necessary. In some space missions, for example, a system with hundreds of components is required to operate for a period of several years. Such systems must naturally employ highly sophisticated fault tolerant control systems (FTCS) with redundant capacity to perform a given task.
The need for very high reliability has led to extensive research into design of systems that can do their job using more than one configuration of their components.
Currently there are two different approaches to the design of reliable systems. In the first approach, the objective is to reduce the dependence of the system on the operation of individual components and develop systems that remain operational even in the presence of a failure without any corrective action being undertaken. A few examples of this passive approach to FTCS are quadriplexed fly-by-wire digital flight control systems and the mid-value select algorithm.
Instead of triplicating or quadriplicating the expensive hardware components or sacrificing the performance of the system under nominal operating conditions in order to gain fault tolerant capability, one can first detect and identify the failed component using additional information processing and then reconfigure the system to accommodate the failure. Clearly, this active approach requires more complex information processing capabilities, but with increasing availability of low cost digital computers this will be the preferred approach--especially if it can result in superior performance.
The integral part of an FTCS is failure detection and identification (FDI). An FDI
process essentially consists of two stages. The first stage is residual generation, and the second stage involves using the residuals to make the appropriate decisions. In this work we shall only concentrate on residual generation, and refer the reader to the extensive literature available for the decision making phase of FDI (see [23] , [10] , and
[201 for comprehensive surveys).
The output of a residual generator is by definition a function of time that is nominally zero or close to zero when no failure is present, but is distinguishably different from zero when a component of the system fails. For example, a simple residual can be generated by differencing the outputs of two identical sensors that measure the same quantity. A failure of either sensor corrupts the residual and this can be used to detect a failure. The process of generating the residuals from relationships among instantaneous outputs of sensors is usually called direct redundancy. Two examples where direct redundancy was exploited are [7, 8] .
It is also possible to generate the residuals using temporal redundancy, which is the process of exploiting the relationships among the histories of sensor outputs and actuator inputs. This is usually done by using a hypothesized model of the dynamics of the system to relate sensor outputs and actuator inputs at different instants of time.
We refer the reader to [6] for an example of the use of temporal redundancy in residual generation.
Among all methods that employ temporal redundancy, two are distinguished as being applicable both to sensor and actuator FDI and, in addition, not requiring any assumption about how the failed component behaves. These are the methods of generalized parity relations, first studied by Chow [4, 5] and later extended by Lou [12, 13] , and the failure detection filter introduced by Beard [2] , which was later amplifed by Jones [11] and recently revisited by Massoumnia 114] .
Each of these two methods involves the design of a linear processor of a particular type of structure. In failure detection and identification filters, the linear processor is a full order observer, with the residuals taken to be the innovations of the observer. The design procedure consists of choosing the observer gain so that failures of different system components affect the residuals in linearly independent directions (hence greatly simplifying the subsequent decision-making process). The restriction to the class of fullstate observer is, as we shall see, a rather severe constraint, as it not only restricts significantly the class of problems that have solutions (the set of possible failure modes must satisfy a strong mutual detcetability (cf. [14j) condition), but it also makes the design process and the nature of the FDI problem appear more complicated than they should.
In the case of generalized parity checks, the concept behind the design process is excedingly simple: we seek residuals generated by forming linear combinations of a finite window of sensor output and applied input values so that all of the residuals are zero when the components are functioning perfectly, but a particular subset of the residuals deviate from zero when a particular system component fails. Again the class of linear processors considered in this design procedure is severely restricted and does not, for example, allow one much freedom in adjusting any free parameters to optimize noise rejection.
In this paper we remove the constraints imposed in these previous studies. In particular, the only constraint we place on our residual generation mechanism are: (a) they produce residuals with the same desirable properties as in previous studies, namely that particular residuals are sensitive only to particular component failure modes; and (b) the mechanism must be a finite-dimensional, linear, time-invariant causal system--i.e., we do not restrict ourselves to the far smaller classes of processors considered in previous work. As we shall see, within this setting it is possible to construct such processors to uniquely identify failures under less restrictive conditions than those previously reported.
For solving the problem of residual generation, we shall rely heavily on a few geometric concepts. Most of these concepts are dual to the ones already developed in the control literature. In fact, by extending the results of [14], we more fully exploit the dual relationship and the subtle differences between the residual generation problem and the control decoupling problem [9, 24] .
We begin in Section 2 by formulating the problem of residual generation, and show how both sensor and actuator failures and also changes in the system parameters can be modeled in a unified manner as actuator failures. In Section 3, the fundamental problem of residual generation is defined. In this problem it is assumed that there are only two possible faulty components and it is desired to generate a residual that is affected by the failure of the first component but not by the failure of the second component. By comparing this residual with a threshold one can decide whether the first component is operating properly or not. In Section 4, the fundamental problem of residual generation is extended to the case of multiple simultaneous failures. The solvability condition of this problem leads to the introduction of the fundamental system theoretic concept of a strongly identifiable family of failure events. In Section 6, the most general form of the 
x(t) = A x(t) + B u(t), y(t) = C x(t).
The spectrum of A is denoted by a(A) and t) denotes union with any common elements repeated. We say a set A is symmetric if X E A implies X* E A where * denotes the complex conjugate. With k a positive integer, k will denote the finite set {1,2, . . .,k}, and k-1 = {1, . . ,k-1}. Moreover, the Laplace transform of an arbitrary function me(t) is denoted by mr(s).
Failure Representation and Problem Formulation
Assume our nominal linear time-invariant (LTI) system is described by the statespace model
Here x(t) E X, u(t) E U, and y(t)E y with the dimensions of X, U, and y being n, m, and I respectively. The nominal input u(t) to the plant and the measurement y(t) are assumed to be known and will be referred to as the observables of the system. Now assume that some unknown disturbances affect the behavior of the plant. These disturbances can be sensor failures and disturbances at the output, which directly corrupt the measurement y(t), or they can be actuator failures and external input disturbances, which will show up in y(t) after their effects are integrated through the dynamics of the system. The most general form of disturbances that can affect the output of the system shown in (1) can be represented as follows:
Here One major distnction between our approach to failure modeling and the majority of approaches reported in the literature is that we do not assume any a priori mode of component failure, i.e., mi(t) and ni(t) in (2) can be arbitrary. However, here it is assumed that the failure can be represented by choosing an appropriate L i or Ji. Note that the same assumption was the basis for the work of Beard and Jones [2, 1] .
Since the mi(t) and n,{t) are arbitrary, there is no loss of generality in assuming (as we shall from now on) that the failure signatures are one-to-one. We shall at times make the assumption that the failure modes are generic in a sense that will be specified when the occasion arises.
We shall also find it more convenient to represent sensor failures by pseudo-actuator failures, as described next. In particluar, note that, without loss of generality, it can be assumed that the unknown function ni(t) is the output of some linear time-invariant system E i with impulse response hi(t,r ) and some arbitrary input si(t). The only restriction on E i is that it should be right invertible so that for any ni(t) there exists an
For the case where the ni(t) are simply scalars, we can assume without loss of generality
for some scalars a i and unknown functions si(t). If the dynamics of the systems generating the sensor failure modes are added to the dynamics of the system, the sensor failures can be represented as actuator failures. In this augmented representation, si(t) appears as a pseudo-actuator failure mode and consequently no sensor failure signature will be present. Hence, all the analysis that follows uses the model
It is assumed that the maps A, B, Li, and C have already been appropriately modified so that the sensor failures are properly represented as pseudo-actuator failures. One caveat is that the augmented model (3) may not be observable even if the systems in (2) was observable. However, by properly choosing the augmented dynamics so that they do not coincide with the spectrum of A in (2), it is always possible to get an observable augmented model if the unagumented system was observable.
Considering now the system in (3), we define the failure detection and identification filter problem (FDIFP) as the problem of designing a dynamic residual generator, Er, that takes the observables u(t) and y(t) as inputs and generates a set of residual vectors ri(t) (i E p) with the following properties:
1. When no failure is present, the residuals ri(t) (i E p) are identically equal to zero. Hence, the net transmission from the input of the system u(t) to the residuals ri(t) (i E p) should be zero.
2. When the j-th component fails (i.e., nj (t) $ 0), the residuals ri(t) for i E Cj should be nonzero, and the other residuals re(t), s E p-1 j, all should be identically equal to zero. Here the family of coding sets Qj C p (j E k) are to be chosen such that we can uniquely identify the failed component or components by knowing which of the ri(t) are zero or not.
We say more about the coding sets 2j later in this section and also in Section 6. A block diagram of an FDIF is given in Figure 2 If we can generate a set of residuals with the above properties, then the identification task is trivial. One needs only to compare the magnitudes of the residuals against some appropriate thresholds to decide which ones correspond to responses to actual failures, and then by referring to the table of the coding sets one can identify the failure, if a failure is present.
One important design consideration is how to choose the coding sets Q2 i. The simplest choice is just to take p=k and Qj = {j} (j E k), i.e., to let precisely one of the residuals be nonzero for any one failure. In addition, this coding scheme enables us to detect and correctly identify simultaneous failures. In Sections 5 and 6, we shall go over more complicated coding schemes. It should be noted that with some coding schemes it is not possible to detect and identify the presence of simultaneous failures. As a matter of fact, for some coding sets, simultaneous failures can lead to identification of the wrong component as failed. However, no matter what coding sets are used, there are families of components for which a failure of a component within the family cannot be uniquely identified. This fundamental limitation will be discussed in Section 6.
Now, consider the most general form of a realizable LTI processor that takes y(t) and u(t) as inputs and generates a set of residuals ri(t) (i E p) as outputs, ;' (t) = F u(t) -E y(t) + G u(t), ri(t ) = M i w(t) -H i y(t) + K i u(t), i E p,
Here ri(t) E Ri and r(t) E R := Re 1 D * * Rp. Also the minus signs in E and H i are just chosen for convenience in what follows.
We can now restate FDIFP as the problem of finding F, E, G, Mi, Ki, and H i in (4) such that the transfer matrices relating the mi(t) and ri(t) have the properties mentioned previously that enable us to determiine from the residuals ri(t) which of the mrnt) are nonzero.
Before proceeding with the solution of FDIFP, we review a few geometric concepts that will be useful in solving the problem.
A subspace S C X is termed A-invariant if A S C S. Let S C X be A-invariant; we write A: S for the restriction of A to S, and A: X/S for the map induced by A on the factor space X/S. Moreover, if S and T are both A-invariant subspaces and S C 7; we write A: T/S for the operator induced by the restriction of A to Ton the factor space
TI/S.
We write B = Im B and <AIB> = B +AB + · · + An-lB for the infimal A-invariant subspace containing B, i.e., the reachable subspace of (A,B). We write
the unobservable subspace of (C,A).
We say a subspace
we denote the family of 
Moreover, for any D E D(S*), S* = <Ker C + S*IA+DC>.
Let {Wi, i E k} be a family of (C,A)-invariant subspaces of X. We say {Wi, i E k} is
if there exists a D such that every Wi is (A+DC)-invariant.
Using the above geometric concepts, we first solve a restricted version of the FDIFP in Secton 3. The solution to this problem will then be used to tackle more general problems in the sections that follow.
The Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation
In this section, we assume that only two failure events are present, and examine when one can design a residual generator that is sensitive to the failure of the first actuator but is insensitive to the failure of the second actuator. This restricted version of FDIFP will be called the fundamental problem in residual generation (FPRG). Later on, FPRG will be extended to more general cases.
Consider the model given in (3) with k = 2,
The dimensions of the maps shown in (8) are the same as the ones given in (1) and (2).
It is desired that a nonzero ml(t) should show up in the output r(t) of the residual generator, while a nonzero m 2 (t) should not affect r(t). As usual, our observables are the measurement y(t) E y and the known actuation signal u(t) E U.
Now consider a residual generator of the form u3(t) = F w(t)-E y(t) + G u(t), r(t) = Mw(t) -H y(t) + K u(t). (9)
Note that this is the most general form of a realizable LTI processor that takes the observables y(t) and u(t) as inputs and generates a residual r(t).
First combine (8) and (9) as follows:
w(t) n2(t )
Define the extended spaces Xe := X e W and U e = U e M2. Let x e := (x, w) E 'e and ue := (U, m2) E Ue. Equation (10) can then be rewritten as follows:
xe(t) = Aexe(t) + B e ue(t) + Leml(t), r(t) = Hexe(t) + Keue(t),
where the definition of the matrices A e , Le, B e , H e , and K e are evident from (10).
Now we formalize the statement that the failure of the first component should showup in the residual r(t), i.e., that a nonzero ml(t) should showup in r(t). There are several possible mathematically unequivalent formulation of the above statement. The most natural formulation is to require that the transfer matrix from ml(s) to r(s) to be left invertible so that any nonzero ml(t) results in a nonzero r(t).
However, another approach is to only require that the system relating ml(t) to r(t) to be input observable. Recall that a system (C,A,B) is input observable if B is monic and the image of B does not intersect the unobservable subspace of (C,A). In terms of transfer matrices,this is equivalent to the requirement that the columns of C(sI-A)-IB should be linearly independent over the field of real numbers. We note that even if the system relating ml(t) to r(t) is not left invertible but is only input observable, it will be extremely unlikely that an arbitrary nonzero ml(t) will hide itself for all t in the null space of the mapping from ml(t) to r(t) so that the failure can not be detected. Hence, if we only require input obvservability, then almost any nonzero ml(t) will produce a nonzero residual r(t). Therefore, it may be argued that the ideal requirement of left invertibility is somewhat of an overkill for failure detection and identification purposes.
It may be further argued that we can even relax the condition of input observability and require only that the transfer matrix from ml(s) to r(s) to be nonzero. However, it will then generally not be possible to reconstruct ml(t) from r(t). By contrast, input observability implies that if the failure mode ml(t) has some rather mild properties, then it is possible to reconstruct m 1 
(t) from r(t).
Note that during the failure accommodation, the one-to-one relation between ml(t) and r(t) can be very valuable, since we can theoretically determine ml(t) from r(t) and hence compensate for its adverse effects.
Finally, if we are dealing with a single-input multi-output system, i.e., if the transfer matrix is simply a column vector, then input observability automatically implies left invertibility. In the context of the FDI problem, the transfer matrix T(s) relating ml(s) to r(s) is usually a column vector (or a scalar), since the failure signature L 1 is usually a column vector. Therefore, in the FDI problem the input observability of T(s) is typically equivalent to its left-invertibility.
Based on these arguments, we state FPRG as follows. Consider the system given in (10) and (11) . FPRG is the problem of finding F, E, G, Al, H, and K such that:
m 1 4 r input observable.
Furthermore, when the condition in (12) (12) and (13) we shall require that, the dynamics of the residual generator be stable.
We need a few preliminary results for deriving the solvability condition for FPRG.
First, let Xe be as defined previously in this section. With x E X, define the embedding map Q: X -+ Xe as follows:
Note that if V C Xe; then Q-1V={x:x E X&lol E V}.
Less precisely, Q-1 V is the intersection of the subspaces V and X.
Using the above definifio5ns, it is-relatively simple to relate the unobservability subspaces of the systems in (11) and (8) . The following fundamental result, which exactly accomplishes this task, is crucial to the solvability condition of FPRG.
Proposition 1: Let Se be the unobservable subspace of (He,Ae); then Q-lSe is a (C,A) unobservability subspace [21, 19, 18] . (
With this result at our disposal, the solvability condition is immediate. 
where S* = inf _S(L2). Also if (16) holds, then the dynamic of the residual generator can be assigned arbitrarily.
Proof: (only if) Consider the systems given in (11) and (10). For (12) to hold, we should have K e = 0, and <AelBe> C S e := <Ker HeIAe>.
Equation (17) implies B e C se; hence, Q-1 Be C S := Q-1Se.
S E S(L2).
(18)
For (13) to hold, we should have L e monic and £e n Se = 0; thus we should have L 1 monic (which we have assumed) and
Obviously ( Obviously, the requirement in (12) is satisfied. Furthermore, 5 n L1 = 0 and L 1 monic imply that PL 1 is monic. Moreover, the pair (M,F) is observable; hence from the definition of input observability it follows that the system relating ml(t) to r(t) is input observable and (13) is satisfied.
0
The major step in the design of the filter is to place the image of the second failure signature in the unobservable subspace of the residual r(t), and then to factor out the unobservable subspace so that the order of the filter is reduced. Also, the condition (16) simply states that the image of the first failure signature should not intersect the unobservable subspace of the residual generator, so that a failure of the first actuator shows up in the residual r(t).
It is clear that the order of the residual generator given in Theorem 2 is n-d(S*), and this order is in general conservative. This is because there may be a u.o.s., S, that satisfies (16) and contains S*. Clearly, using this S the order of the residual generator can be further reduced. Unfortunately, there is no systematic way of constructing such non-infimal unobservability subspaces. However, for the case of monic C, the minimal solution is easy (see [15] ).
The reader who is familiar with the disturbance decoupled estimation problem (DDEP) [21, 3] will readily recognize the relationship between DDEP and FPRG.
However, these two problems have subtle differences that completely distinguish them from each other. In DDEP, the state to be estimated is given as part of the problem statement. In FPRG, we have to find the part of the state space that can be estimated even in the presence of unknown input m2(t).
An interesting interpretation of the solution to FPRG can be given. Referring to Theorem 2, the residual generator can be rewritten as follows:
wv(t) = AO w(t) -PDoy(t) + G u(t) + Dlr(t), r(t) = NI w(t) -Hy(t).
l Note that by choosing D O and H appropriately, we change the observability properties of (HC,A+DoC) in such a way that the second actuator failure becomes unobservable from the residual. Next, by-injecting the residual r(t) back in the filter, the spectrum of the residual generator can be modified as desired. Clearly, the residual generator given in (20) , can be thought of as an observer for the hypothetical system
where (21), we get Therefore, the gain matrix D 1 can be used to find a compromise between conflicting objectives.
uh(t) := P(Bu(t)-Doy(t)) is the hypothetical input, and Yh(t) := H y(t) is

z(t) = AO z(t) + uh(t) + v 3 (t),
Yh(t) = Mz(t) + v 4 (t),
Next the generic solvability of FPRG is discussed. 
Proof: The simple proof is given in [15] .
0
Note that if the S* defined in Theorem 2 is used to design a residual generator, then the generic order of the processor is n-k 2 . Also, the condition given in (24) 
wv(t) = -5 w(t) -[-2, -10] y(t) + [.5, 01 u(t), r(t)= w(t)-[0, 1] y(t).
Note that if the first failure signature had been
then clearly L1 C S* and FPRG would not have had a solution. We shall continue this example in the next subsection after some additional theoretical developments.
Extension of FPRG to Multiple Failure Events
In this section we extend FPRG to the case of multiple failures. Let us assume that k failure events are present, and we want to design a processor that generates k residuals,
ri(t) (i E k), such that a failure of the i-th component, i.e., a nonzero mi(t), can only affect the i-th residual ri(t) and no other residuals rj (t) (j y/ i).
More precisely, what we require is that the transfer matrix relating mi(s) to ri(s) should be input observable, and the transfer matrix from mi(s) to all other ri{s) should be zero.
In the notation of Section 2, the problem we have just formulated is the same as the FDIFP with the the coding sets fi = {i} (i E k). This particular version of the FDIFP will be called the extension of the fundamental problem in residual generation (EFPRG).
Obviously, if EFPRG has a solution, then it is possible to detect and identify even
simultaneous failures with almost arbitrary modes for each component failure. Note that for identifying simultaneous failures, we need at least as many residuals as there are failure events. In this sense, the coding set i =--i} (i E k) (or any permutation of it) is minimal.
In a recent article, Massoumnia [14] defined the similar problem of designing a residual generator of the form
t (t) = (A+DC) w(t) -D y(t) + B u(t), ri(t) = Hi(W(t) -y(t)),
such that a nonzero mi(t) only shows up in the residual ri(t). This problem is a slight generalization of the failure detection filter problem and was referred to as the restricted diagonal detection filter problem (RDDFP) in [14] . Obviously, RDDFP is a special case of the FPRG that we have formulated here since in FPRG the matrix F is not restricted to be of the form A+DC for some appropriate gain matrix D (nor is w required to be of the same dimension as x).
The solvability condition for EFPRG now follows immediately from that of the FPRG.
Theorem 4: EFPRG has a solution if and only if
Si* n Li = , iEk,
where Si* : inf S(Ej i £j), i Ek. 
Proof: The simple proof is given in [15] . (
Note that if the family {Si*, i E k} defined in Theorem 4 is used to design a residual generator, then the generic order of the processor is
To illustrate the design procedure given in Theorem 4, we now continue Example 1 of Section 3.
Example 2:
The residual generator we designed previously is the same as Zrl of Theorem 4. Therefore, rename the r(t) given in (26) as rl(t), and we only need to design the residual generator, Er2, which is sensitive to the failure of the second actuator but is not affected by the failure of the first actuator. Using (6) 
where
r(t) := [rl(t), r 2 (t)]'.
To gain some insight into the problem, let us compute several different transfer matrices associated with this example. First denote the transfer matrix relating
rn(s) = [ml(s), n 2 (s)]' to y(s) by Gm(s).
A simple computation shows 
0
Motivated by the last example, the solvability condition of the EFPRG in the frequency domain is now developed. For the remainder of this section, it is assumed that the failure signatures are simply column vectors.
We can rewrite (3) as follows:
by taking the Laplace transform of both sides.
In (34), Gu(s) := C(sI-A)-iB,
Gm(s) := C(sI-A)-1[L 1 , . .. ,Lk], and m(s)= [ml(s), . . . ,mk(s)] '. The objective of EFPRG can now be restated as generating a k dimensional vector r(t) by passing the observation vector z(t) -[y'(t), u'(t)] ' through a causal LTI system characterized by the transfer matrix H(s), i.e, r(s) = H(s) z(s) = [H(s), Hu(s)] [ y(s) ,
u(s) J
such that the net transmission from the input u(t) to the residual vector r(t) is zero, and the failure mode mi(t) only affects the i-th component of the residual vector r(t). In other words, the objective is to find a proper post compensator H(s) such that
H(s)G(s)= [-T(s), O],
Gm(s) G;(s) G(s)
| |,(37)
I the in (36) is a kXm matrix, and T(s) is a k Xk diagonal matrix with nonzero diagonal elements Ti(s).
In addition, when no failure is present, the residuals due to initial conditions in the system and in the post-compensator should die away so. The residual due to a nonzero initial condition x(0) is simply Hy(s)Gs(s)x(O) where
Hence the transfer matrix Hy(s)G,(s) should be stable. Also the residual due to nonzero initial conditions of the post compensator should die away, so we require that H(s) be stable.
It is shown in [15] (also see [16] ), that the above problem has a solution if and only if the transfer matrix Gm(s) is left invertible. In other words, when the failure signatures are column vectors, the condition of strong identifiability given in (28) is equivalent to the left invertibility of
The reader who is familar with the control decoupling problem [9, 24] should readily recognize the dual relationship between the EFPRG and that problem. Despite of this duality, the structure of the residual generator proposed in Theorem 4 is quite different from that of the extended decoupling controllers given in the fundamental reference [241.
This is because of the fact that here we are concerned with designing observers and there is more flexibility, but in the decoupling problem the objective is to design control systems and the problem is more restrictive. However, it is interesting to note that the generic order of the residual generator given in (31) is exactly equal to the generic order of the extended decoupling controller given in Theorem ? of [24] if the matrices involved are properly transposed. Now, an interesting question is how to reduce the order of the processor given in Theorem 4. This task can be accomplished by either restricting the structure of the residual generator, as was done in [14] by formulating the RDDFP, or by deleting the requirement that the filter should be capable of detecting and identifying simultaneous failures. We shall follow the latter path in the remainder of this paper, by considering more complicated coding schemes than the one dealt with in this section.
Triangular Detection Filter Problem
The first problem in the above category that we formulate and solve is the triangular detection filter problem (TDFP). Consider the system in (3) and the residual generator (27). In TDFP the objective is to design k residuals ri(t) (i E k) such that a nonzero mr affects r 1 and possibly affects r 2 ,. . . ,rk; a nonzero m 2 affects r 2 without affecting r 1 but possibly affecting r 3 , . .. ,rk; ... finally, a nonzero mk affects rk without affecting rl ... ,rk_ 1 . In the notation of Section 2, this process of relating the failure events to the residuals corresponds to the coding sets Q2 i = {i} U A i where A i is some subset of {i+1, ... ,k. The input-output relation of TDFP is shown in Figure 5 -1, which shows the origin of its name. 
Si nL i =O iEk.
The requirement given in (40) where So* = X, and A i (i E k) are arbitrary symmetric sets.
Proof:
The proof is the dual of the one given in [17] , and hence is omitted.
A family of failure signatures satisfying the solvability conditions of TDFP is not necessarily a strongly identifiable family. However, it is clear from Theodrem 6 that any strongly identifiable family of failure signatures satisfies the solvability conditions of TDFP. For such families, the order of the filter that solves TDFP is only n (same as the order of the system model). On the other hand, RDDFP may not have a solution for this family of failure signatures; since Massoumnia showed in [14] that strong identifiability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the solvability of RDDFP.
Our last remark concerns the case of simple sensor failures that can be modeled by taking Ji in (2) 
and that a family of detection spaces {T/*, i E k} was termed output separable if the output images of the detection spaces were independent, i.e., if C.*n(.j.C7ic *)= o, iCk.
Using the state space augmentation procedure given in Section 2, it is always possible to model I simple sensor failures as a family of I pseudo-actuator failures with output separable detection spaces. Now using the preceding remarks, it follows immediately that there always exists an n+l dimensional filter with arbitrarily assignable spectrum that triangularly detects and identifies any family of I sensor failures, assuming that the actuators are fully reliable. This fact is one of the most useful applications of TDFP.
For more details we refer the reader to [15] .
Failure Detection and Identification Filter Problem
Our objective in this section is to state necessary and sufficient conditions for it to be possible to design a residual generator that can be used to uniquely detect and identify a failure within a family of k possible failure events, assuming that only one failure is present at a time. This problem will lead to the introduction of the fundamental concept of an identifiable family of failure signatures.
In order to treat the above problem, it is necessary to more concretely define the Using the definition of a coding matrix, we construct A:
The coding scheme used in this example is called a binary coding. This is because the columns of A (e.g., [0, 1, 1] ') are just the binary representations of the corresponding column indices of A (e.g., 6). When binary coding is used, the minimum number, p, of residuals is simply
where Clearly, any row of A that is the sum of other rows of A is redundant. For example, assume that for some coding matrix the first row is the same as the sum of the second and third rows. Then the second and third residuals are sufficient for FDI purposes, and the first residual is not necessary; however, this redundant residual may be useful in the decision making process, given the presence of noise and uncertainties.
Now define the finite set F i as the collection of all those j E k for which bij= O. For example, the family F i (i E p) associated with the binary coding sets we used in Example 3 is simply:
Note that the sets Fi (i E p) contain all the information required for specifying the structure of the transfer matrix relating the failure events to the residuals.
Using the above preliminary concepts, we now derive the solvability condition for FDIFP. 
Proof: (only if) Recall that the objective of FDIFP is to generate p residuals, rl (t) (l E p), such that when the j-th component fails, the residuals ri(t) for i E 7j should be nonzero, and the other residuals all should be identically zero. We can think of FDIFP as p separate FPRG (see Section 3)-one for each row of A-which should be solvable simultaneously. Using the necessary condition for solvability of FPRG (see Theorem 2) and the assumption that there is only one failure present at a time, the condition given in (45) follows immediately.
(if) Simply use the unobservability subspaces Sri (i E p) to design p separate residual generators each being the solution to an FPRG corresponding to different rows of the coding matrix (see Theorem 2 for construction of the residual generator).
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Note that all of our remarks in Section 3 about accommodating the effect of sensor and process noise hold equally well for the residual generators of Theorem 7.
The following example illustrates the design procedure. The following result will be crucial to our derivation. Thus the infimality of T 1 * implies that T 1 * C T 2 *, and hence CT 1 * C CT 2 *. From the observability of (C,A) and some of the results of [14], we know CT 1 * and CT2* are both one dimensional; thus CT,* = CT 2 *, or equivalently TI* + Ker C-= T 2 * + Ker C := V.
Also T 2 * and T 1 * are compatible since Tl*+T 2 * -T 2 * is (C,A)-invariant (see [151) . Let D E nD(Ti*). Using (47) and (7), we have T2* = < VA+DC> = Ti*.
Theorem 9:
Given an LTI system (C,A,B) with a family of failure signatures {Li, i E k} with arbitrary modes of failures, and assuming that there is only one failure present at a time, it is possible to design a coding set and a residual generator to detect and identify any failure within this family if and only if
where Ti* := inf S(Li).
Proof: (only if) Suppose that we have designed a residual generator with an appropriate family of coding sets. Recall that no two columns of the coding matrix associated with these coding sets should be the same. Using this property, it follows that for any two distinct integers 1,j E k, there should exist an i such that either
Now let the family of detection spaces { T/*, i E k} be as defined in (42). If (50) holds, then obviously T/* C Sri. Similarly, if (49) holds, then Tj* C Sr.. Now using the necessary condition given in (45) and the argument in (49) and (50), it follows that for any l,j E k either Li n T7* = 0 or Lj n T* = 0.
Using (51) 
(if) We need to show that if a family of failure signatures satisfies the condition given in (52), then there exists a family of coding sets for which the FDIFP, with the assumption that only one failure is present at a time, has a solution. For this, just use the coding sets 2 ({1, . . . ,i-l,i+l, . . ,k}, i k, (53) to design k different residual generators such that the unobservable subspace of the i-th residual is simply Ti*, so that the failure of the i-th component will not show up in this residual.
0
Note that if we are using the coding sets (53) to design the residual generator, then the unobservable subspace of the i-th residual is exactly the detection space we defined earlier. Hence, a more appropriate name for such a subspace seems to be the undetectable subspace of a failure signature, but in order to conform with the notions introduced in the work of Beard [2] , we chose to continue to use the name detection 
C(sI-A)-lLimi(s) = C(sI-A)-1 Ljm 3 (s).
This means that there exist failure modes for the i-th and the j-th components that result in the same output; hence, it will be impossible to distinguish between the failure of these two components with these failure modes by observing the output of the system.
Conclusion
In this paper we have solved the problem of generating residuals for the purpose of detecting and identifying control system component failures by processing the commanded inputs and measured outputs of a linear time-invariant system. We have also developed simple design procedures for generating the residuals when the solvability conditions are satisfied.
We should mention that all of our results hold equally well for discrete-time systems, since our approach has been entirely geometric. Therefore, the left hand side of (3) can be replaced with x(t+l) and the solvability condition for all of the problems that we have formulated here will remain unchanged. An interesting characteristic of residual generators for discrete-time systems is that we can assign the spectrum of the filter to the origin of the complex plane, and hence obtain dead-beat behavior. It can be shown that the residuals thus obtained are the generalized parity relations introduced by Chow [5] .
We refer the reader to [161 and [15] for a more complete discussion of the relationship between the generalized parity relations and the residual generators discussed in this article.
A challenging problem that we did-not address in this paper is the task of generating residuals that are robust to the modeling errors. Lou [12, 13] and Chow [4, 51 have done some preliminary work on the problem of robust parity relations. Using our results, it is clear that the residual generator is a finely tuned processor that relies on the given dynamics of the plant. Speciffically, for actuator failures, the design of the processor relies on inverting the transfer matrix of the system, which can be quite sensitive to changes in the system parameters. We also point out that the issue in robust residual generation is not simply the stability of the perturbed system as in many robust control system problems, but the preservation as nearly as possible of the diagonal structure of the transfer matrices in the presence of plant uncertainties. This is a much more complicated problem and deserves the attention of researchers in linear system theory and robust control. 
